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RECENT TRENDS
F.B.I. REcoRDs
The seemingly impervious computer banks,
wherein the Federal Bureau of Investigation main-
tains its secret files on private American citizens,
suffered two minor cracks in recent months. In
Jabara v. Kelly, - F. Supp. - (E.D. Mich. 1974),
the court refused to take at face value a government
assertion of executive privilege regarding the
secrecy of investigative records. Rather, the court
chose to examine the questioned records in camera.
By balancing the competing interests, the court
determined whether information contained therein
sought by a private litigant should be disclosed.
Jabara was a pro-Arab, activist attorney who
had apparently been the subject of an ongoing
F.B.I. investigation. In a § 19831 civil rights suit
against the F.B.I. he alleged that the investigators
had violated his first, fourth, fifth and ninth
amendment rights through overt and covert sur-
veillance. The plaintiff filed a discovery motion
seeking information from the F.B.I. as to whether
wiretaps had been performed, and when, where and
what conversations had been recorded. The gov-
ernment claimed that the manifest public interest
in preserving secrecy would support a holding that
the information was subject to executive privilege,
arguing that such disclosure might jeopardize gov-
ernment informers, compromise continuing investi-
gations and expose tactical intelligence.
Citing as its main authority an unreported
opinion by District Judge Vanartsdalen,2 the Sixth
Circuit found it necessary and proper to "deter-
mine the primacy of the interests of the Govern-
ment versus those of the individual, balancing the
necessity of the individual in obtaining the in-
formation against the Governmental need in main-
taining the secrecy of the information." 3 The court
allowed the plaintiff's discovery. This blow to the
defendant was softened by the court's assurance
142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
'Philadelphia Resistance v. John N. Mitchell, (E.D.
Pa. No. 71-1738, Aug. 3, 1972).
- F.2d at - (Judge Freeman quoting Judge
Vanartsdalen in Philadelphia Resistance). See also
Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 371 F. Supp. 97
(D.D.C. 1974) (Judge Rickey); Frankenhauser v.
Risso, 17 FED. RuI.Es Sziv. 2d 16 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Contra, Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 50 F.R.D.
130 (D.D.C. 1970) (Judge Sirica); Capitol Vending Co.
Inc. v. Baker, 35 F.R.D. 511 (D.D.C. 1964).
that only that information essential to plaintiff's
case would be disclosed, regardless of the outcome
of any balancing.
The decision in Menard v. Saxbe, _ F.2d -
(D.C. Cir. 1974), also pierced the shroud of secrecy
surrounding F.B.I. records. The D.C. Circuit held
that the F.B.I. had no statutory right to retain the
record of an individual's arrest for an offense for
which that individual had not been prosecuted.
The court recognized the detrimental effect of an
arrest record upon an individual's opportunities for
employment, upon his treatment by police and
upon his ability to testify in courts of law. Despite
the unrebutted presumption of innocence, the rec-
ord wrongly damaged Menard's reputation.4
Consequently, the Bureau was held to have a duty
to expunge the record of this particular non-con-
victed arrest from its files.'
Although petitioner Menard argued that reten-
tion and dissemination of the F.B.I. record violated
his constitutional rights,' the court's decision
rested upon a statutory basis. Judge Leventhall,
speaking for the court, said that the federal statute7
4 For discussions on the detrimental impact of an ar-
rest record see Comment, Branded: Arrest Records of
the Unconviated, 44 Miss. LJ. 928 (1973); Note, Dis-
crimination on the Basis of Arrest Records, 56 CoR-ELx.
L. REv. 470 (1971).
5 See United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th
Cir. 1967) (duty to expunge is inherent in the right to
collect data). For general discusssions on the expunge-
ment of criminal records see Kogan, Sealing and Ex-
pungement of Criminal Records-The Big Lie, 61 J.
Crmm. L.C. & P.S. 378 (1970); Comment, Retention and
Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38
U. Cn. L. REv. 850 (1971); Comment, Arrest Record
Expungement-A Function of the Criminal Court, 1971
UAIr L. REv. 381 (1971); Note, 35 U. Pr. L. Rv.
205 (1973) (case note on Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d
152).
6 For further comments see Comment, F.B.L Rap
Sheets-An Invasion of Constitutional Rights?, 20
CATH. U.L. REV. 511 (1971); Note, Arrest and Credit
Records: Can the Right to Privacy Survive?, 25 U. FLA.
L. REy. 681 (1972).
728 U.S.C. § 534 (1970) provides:
(a) The Attorney General shall-
(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identi-
fication, criminal identification, crime and
other records; and
(2) exchange these records with, and for the of-
ficial use of, authorized officials of the Fed-
eral Government, the States, cities, and
penal and other institutions.
(b) the exchange of records authorized by subsection
(a) (2) of this section is subject to cancellation if
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authorizing data collection by the F.B.I. implicitly
requires the Bureau to distinguish and separate files
of convicted criminals and those of so called neutral
(innocent) persons. All records of non-convicted
persons should be maintained in the latter file, the
retention of which, the court felt, would yield none
of the detrimental effects of a record in the "crimi-
nal" file. Although not basing its decision on
constitutional grounds, the court did express con-
cern with the constitutional issue as well.8
Finally the court concluded that although the
F.B.I., upon proper request, has a duty to expunge
a record of non-conviction, the proceedings must be
initiated by private individuals at the local level.
This procedure is reasonable in light of the fact that
the Bureau's records are derivative, i.e., they come
from those local jurisdictions, and because imposing
this positive duty upon the Bureau would create
an unwieldy burden.
JURY SELCTIONs
Although the constitutional right to a fair and
representative jury is applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court has provided only
vague directives as to what procedures will uphold
this constitutional right. Any method which ar-
bitrarily excludes any identifiable, but otherwise
qualified group to serve as jurors, will be found un-
constitutional. 9 The primary test has been whether
the selection procedure was designed to produce a
representative cross-section of the community, not
whether it actually was successful. 10 Despite vo-
dissemination is made outside the receiving
departments or related agencies.
(c) The Attorney General may appoint officials to
perform the functions authorized by this section.
8 "We think sound principles of justice and judicial
administration dictate that in general actions to vindi-
cate constitutional rights, by expungement of arrest
records [are mandatory]." - F.2d at _.
9 See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County,
396 U.S. 320 (1970); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346
(1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967);
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
10 An early succinct definition of the cross section
principle was:
[Tihere is a constitutional right to a jury drawn from
a group which represents a cross section of the com-
munity. And a cross section of the community in-
cludes persons with varying degrees of training and
intelligence and with varying economic and social
positions. Under our Constitution, the jury is not
to be made the representative of the most intelli-
gent, the most wealthy or the most successful, nor
of the least intelligent, the least wealthy or the
least successful. It is a democratic institution,
representative of all qualified classes of People.
luminous litigation over whether specific schemes
meet this broad standard, the Supreme Court has
failed to delineate a more specific test. Several re-
cent cases have brought this issue back into the
limelight, and the often conflicting results have
shed little new light on the application of this con-
stitutional right.
In Reed v. State, 292 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1974), the
Florida supreme court upheld a statutory scheme"
for jury selection which excluded all persons under
age 21 and which classified eligible jurors as: pro-
fessional persons, government employees and per-
sons over 65. The court decided that the twenty-
sixth amendment which had enfranchised 18 to 21
year olds, had not reduced the broad discretion of
the states in establishing qualifications for jurors.
Although the Florida plan excluded a group of
persons deemed qualified to vote, the court believed
that the state retained the authority to determine
that these same persons were not qualified to be
jurors.2 The majority noted the Supreme Court's
failure to establish more specific standards for a
"fair" jury selection procedure and found the
Florida scheme within the proper scope of discre-
tion left to the states."
Justices Erwin and Boyd argued vigorously in
dissent that the spirit, if not the letter, of the
Supreme Court decisions on this issue requires that
a jury selection procedure be as random as possible
in selecting jurors from all qualified persons. They
asserted that the twenty-sixth amendment demon-
strates that persons aged 18 to 21 are qualified for
the responsibilities of citizenship, hence they should
also be qualified for jury service, and their exclusion
is arbitrary and unconstitutional. The justices fur-
ther argued that the statute's classification system
is also unconstitutional because it provides for a
process that is manipulated so as to insure repre-
sentation from certain social, economic and age
Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 299 (1947) (Murphy,
J., dissenting).
"FLA. STAT. § 40.01 (1970).
"For a discussion of jury selection procedures which
discriminate against young adults see Comment, Con-
stitutionality of Excluding Young People From Jury
Service, 29 WAsH. & LEx L. Rxv. 731 (1973). On jury
selection systems in general see Beiser, Are Juries
Representative?, 57 JbDICATuRE 194 (1973); Note,
Jury Selection and the Equal Protection Clause, 2
U.C.LA.-ALAsxA L. Rav. 141 (1973).
1For discussions on the burden of challenging a
questionable jury selection scheme see Comment,
Constitutional Law-Burden of Proof in Juror Dis-
crimination Cases in Missouri, 38 Mo. L. REv. 99
(1973); Note, Challenging The Jury Selection System
in New York, 36 ALBANY L. Rxv. 305 (1972).
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groups. Since no rational state interest is served by
this classification, the dissenters concluded that a
selection process based upon voter registration lists
and without the classification system was necessary
to produce a random cross-section of the com-
munity. 4
In Louisiana, the state supreme court upheld a
jury selection procedure which possessed provisions
which resulted in sex discrimination. The procedure
challenged in State v. Stevenson, 292 So. 2d 488 (La.
1974), excludes women from the selection process
unless they file a written declaration of willingness
to serve. No such affirmative duty is imposed upon
the male population. Intuitively, this system would
seem to arbitrarily exclude many women from jury
service, or at best work to discourage women from
participating on juries. However, the right to a
representative jury belongs to the defendant. View-
ing the Louisiana procedure from this perspective,
the system forces men to serve while allowing
women to opt out. This results in an arbitrary and
distinctively non-random jury character. The
Louisiana supreme court, nonetheless, held that
the system was not unconstitutional.
In Bradley v. Judge of Superior Court, - F.
Supp. - (C.D. Cal. 1974), the court allowed a jury
selection system to stand which provided that
jurors for a particular district be selected from the
entire county of which that district was but a small
part. In spite of evidence that this scheme reduced
the percentages of black jurors in the district from
32 per cent to 8 per cent, and of Mexican-American
jurors from 18 per cent to 7 per cent, the district
court did not believe that the challengers had
shown that the plan fell short of the constitutional
demands for a jury selection procedure designed to
produce a fair cross-section of the community1 5
JUVEN JUsTIcE
The juvenile justice system remains in a state of
flux. Efforts to establish separate systems for proc-
essing juvenile and adult offenders have struggled
1
4 For a serious challenge to this conclusion see Com-
ment, Voter Registration Lists; Do They Yield a Jury
Representative of the Community?, 5 U. MicH. J.L. REP.
385 (1972).
15Two other recent cases further illustrate the
heavy burden which a challenge to a jury selection
procedure must overcome. Thompson v. Sheppard,
490 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1974) (disproportionate racial
and sexual characteristics of resultant jurors does not
show the system itself is invalid); Partida v. State, 506
S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (fact that grand
jurors were only 39% Mexican-American in a commu-
nity where same constituted 79% of the population
does not show system designed improperly).
between the twin goals of eliminating the harshness
of adult criminal procedures and simultaneously
satisfying constitutional and statutory demands.
When it became obvious in the last decade that
the de-institutionalization of juvenile justice had
vested immense discretion in the juvenile courts,
the United States Supreme Court hastened to warn
that some, 6 but not all, 7 constitutional guarantees
of due process extend to juvenile adjudications.
Today, courts continue to wrestle with the am-
biguous dictates of the Supreme Court in the de-
termination of which constitutional standards are
required for juvenile justice.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals remains
uncertain as to whether the fifth amendment's
double jeopardy clause applies to juvenile proceed-
ings. In In re Anderson, 321 A.2d 516 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1974), the defendant had been referred
by the juvenile court to a hearing before a master.
In spite of the master's report that the evidence
was insufficient to sustain the charge, the juvenile
court chose to conduct its own hearing de novo. The
appellate court held that even assuming that the
double jeopardy clause did apply, this particular
procedure, unique to the juvenile court, was not
unconstitutional. The master, it was found, was
only an aid to the juvenile court, and his decision
was held to not be a separate adjudication.
In People v. Ellis, 57 Ill. 2d 627, 311 N.E.2d 98
(1974), the Illinois supreme court found a sta-
tutory procedure which discriminated between
male and female juveniles, in violation of the equal
rights amendment of the state constitution. The
Illinois Juvenile Court Act placed males under 18
years of age and females under 19 years of age
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The
court could see no rational state interest in this
classification. Although the court found it unnec-
essary to reach the federal constitutional issue, the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause
could be an alternative basis for the same result.
16See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)
(due process guarantors of 1) notice, 2) right to counsel,
3) privilege against self-incrimination, and 4) right of
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses apply
to juvenile adjudicatory hearings); See also In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (affirming that the basis of
Kent was that constitutional rights are not for adults
alone); cjf. In re Winship,397 U.S. 358 (1970) (adjudica-
tion of delinquency requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt).
1T See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971) (due process does not require a jury trial in
juvenile proceedings).
1For discussions on sex-based discrimination in
juvenile justice see Equal Protection For Juveniles- The
19741
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A Kentucky sentencing provision which, it was
claimed, discriminates between adults and juve-
niles, did survive an equal protection attack. In
Fryrear v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1974), the court held that a prior decision,
holding that a life sentence amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment for a juvenile rapist, was not
determinative of the same issue for an adult rapist.
The distinction between adults and juveniles for
sentencing purposes was found to be rational and
not violative of the equal protection clause.
Several courts have struggled with the due proc-
ess problems inherent in schemes for deferring a
juvenile defendant to the adult criminal courts. In
People v. Fields, 391 Mich. 206, 216 N.W.2d 51
(1974), the Michigan supreme court affirmed the
view that guidelines for such deferral must be stat-
utorily established rather than left to the discre-
tion of the judge. But in State v. Grayer, 191 Neb.
523, 215 N.W.2d 859 (1974), the Nebraska supreme
court reached a contrary position by upholding
prosecutorial discretion in the decision whether to
proceed against a juvenile in juvenile or adult
court.
19
Besides the constitutional dimension to juvenile
proceedings, the courts have been troubled over
the implementation of statutory provisions. An
outstanding example is the conflicting interpreta-
tions by federal courts with regards to the Youth
Corrections Act.20 In United States v. Kaylor, 491
Present Status of Sex-Based Discrimination in Juvenile
Court Law, 7 GA. L. Rxv. 494 (1973); 1 FoRnHAm
URBN L.J. 286 (1972).
19 For discussions on the waiver issue in juvenile
proceedings, see Comment, Due Process and Waiver of
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 30 WAsH. & LMx L. REV.
591 (1973); Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion and the
Decision to Waive Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 1973
WAsH. U.L.Q. 436 (1973); Note, Constitutional Law-
Jruvenile Waiver Statut--Ddegation of Legislative Power
to Judiciary, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 259 (1973).
20 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1970) provides:
(a) If the court is of the opinion that the youth
offender does not need commitment, it may suspend
the imposition or execution of sentence and place
the youth offender on probation.
(b) If the court shall find that a convicted person
is a youth offender, and offense is punishable by
imprisonment under applicable provisions of law
other than this subsection, the court may in lieu
of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided
by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody
of the Attorney General for treatment and super-
vision pursuant to this chapter until discharged by
the Division as provided in section 5017(c) of this
chapter; or
(c) If the court shall find that the youth of-
fender may not be able to derive maximum benefit
from treatment by the Division prior to the expira-
ation of six years from the date of conviction it may,
F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit upheld
the presumption that the sentencing of juveniles
was to be imposed according to YCA (as opposed
to the statutory penalty for the substantive of-
fense). Kaylor had been sentenced according to the
statutory penalty rather than under the YCA
apparently because the judge had found that there
would be "no benefit" from YCA sentencing. The
court of appeals held that the "no benefit" excep-
tion to YCA sentencing requires a judge to make
an express finding of "no benefit," stating his
reasons therefor. Only an extraordinary finding
would justify divergence from Chogress' intent to
make YCA sentencing the presumptive standard
for juveniles.
In United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652 (5th
Cir. 1974), the Fifth Circuit, in reviewing sentences
in three different cases, also addressed itself to the
proper scope of discretion under the YCA. In the
first case the juvenile defendant had been sen-
tenced for the maximum four years under the YCA.
He could have received a maximum of one year for
the substantive offense, but the judge, indicating
on the record that he did not believe one year to
be sufficient, utilized the YCA provisions to impose
a greater sentence. The Fifth Circuit reversed, find-
ing this decision contrary to Congressional intent
and an improper exercise of discretion under the
Act. In the second case, a juvenile defendant re-
ceived a five year maximum sentence for the sub-
stantive offense. The judge had given no considera-
tion to YCA sentencing because he believed the
substantive offense involved required the maximum
punishment available. Again the court of appeals
in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise
provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the
custody of the Attorney General for treatment and
supervision pursuant to this chapter for any further
period that may be authorized by law for the offense
of which he stands convicted or until discharged
by the Division so provided in section 5017(d) of
this chapter.
(d) If the court shall find that the youth of-
fender will not derive benefit from treatment under
subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence
the youth offender under any other applicable pen-
alty provision.
(e) If the court desires additional information
as to whether a youth offender will derive benefit
from treatment under subsections (b) or (c) it may
order that he be committed to the custody of the
Attorney General for observation and study at an
appropriate classification center or agency. Within
sixty days from the date of the order, or such addi-
tional period as the court may grant, the Division
shall report to the court its findings.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on this is-
sue in Dorszyinski v. United States, 484 F.2d 849
(9th Cir.), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 1091 (1973).
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held this to be an improper exercise of discretion
under the YCA, saying that a judge must consider
YCA sentencing for every juvenile. In the third
case, however, the appellate court upheld the sen-
tencing of a juvenile of the maximum allowed for
the substantive offense. There had been no indica-
tion of prejudice from the record, and the judge
had taken evidence on rehabilitative possibilities
under the YCA. A lone dissenter from the Fifth
Circuit took the stricter view of the Second Circuit,
believing that the absence of an express finding of
"no benefit" constituted reversible error.
1974]
